As Hammond29 noted, few cases to date have dealt with the disposition of patients who are minimally conscious. Two cases that Hammond cited, In re Conroy30 in New Jersey in 1985 and In re Edna M.F.31 in Wisconsin in 1995, involved patients with severe dementia who did not have a severe TBI or hypoxic-ischemic injury, although they could be considered minimally conscious from a functional standpoint. Excluding these two cases, two others alone involve minimally conscious patients at the level of a state supreme court: In re Martin32 in Michigan, which was decided in 1992, and Wendland v Wendland33 in California, which was decided in 2001. In both these cases, the courts were asked to decide what level of evidence of prior wishes was necessary before a wife could remove artificial nutrition and hydration over the objections of other family members from a husband with TBI caused by a motor vehicle accident. In both cases, the husband could not walk or talk but could respond to simple commands and had previously told his wife that he would not want to live “like a vegetable” but had not made oral or written directives if he became minimally conscious. In both cases, the courts required clear and convincing evidence of the patients’ wishes regarding the latter condition before it would allow removal of a feeding tube. Nevertheless, cases such as these only come to courts because of disputes among family members or among surrogates and physicians, and such disputes are rare.34 As noted by Lo and colleagues35 after the Wendland decision, families and physicians usually can and should make end-of-life decisions for patients who lack the capacity to do so on the basis of what they believe the patients would want or what is best for them, without fear of court involvement.